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By Lois G. Farer.
New York: W.W. Norton & Co. 1984. Pp. xi, 244. $16.95.

MONEY AND JUSTICE: WHO OWNS THE COURTS?

In Money and Justice, Lois G. Forer1 explains that she "does not
purport to discuss theories of fairness, equality, or justice" (p. 223
n.24). But precisely these notions, and most particularly the idea of
fairness, underlie Judge Forer's treatment of unequal access to the
courts. Whether framed in terms of due process or equal protection of
the law, fairness is the issue here. As a former President noted, life
isn't fair. Some people are wealthy, many are not. Corporations have
extensive resources and power, most individuals do not. The question
is whether society can live with a legal system that, often with frightening accuracy, mirrors the unfairness of the social structure. Forer
maintains that it cannot.
Money and Justice presents the thesis that "American courts are
not equally open and available to all who have legal claims and defenses - that there is turnstile justice for the poor and lengthy trials
and appeals for those who can afford to pay for lawyers, investigations,
expert witnesses, and documentary and physical evidence" (p. 14).
Because of this disparity in trial time and quality of representation, the
author concludes that most poor people do not receive due process in
either civil or criminal courts. This problem of varying standards of
justice based on economic status has, of course, been discussed before. 2
Forer adds to the subject her perspective as a trial judge in a state
court, where she witnessed, first-hand, inequities in the application of
law.
Forer's examination of unequal justice focuses on the bifurcated
legal system. There is, in law, what she calls a two-track system: a
fast-track composed of lawyers who are highly intelligent graduates of
top law schools and who inevitably end up in large corporate firms,
and a slow-track composed of lawyers who have less impressive credentials and who tend to be mediocre, even incompetent. Fast-track
lawyers never see the poor; slow-track lawyers represent the poor, but
often do a bad job of it (pp. 57-66). Lawyers, however, as well as their
clients, are victims of "the system" (p. 73). Law schools are popping
up like dandelions; deficient curricula and faculty, along with low ad1. Lois G. Forer is a judge of the Court of Common Pleas in Philadelphia. Before ascending
the bench in 1971, she practiced Jaw for thirty-two years; eight of those years were spent as
Deputy Attorney General for Pennsylvania. She is also the author of CRIMINALS AND VICTIMS
(1980); THE DEATH OF THE LAW (1975); and "No ONE WILL LISSEN": How OUR LEGAL
SYSTEM BRUTALIZES THE YOUTHFUL POOR (1970).
2. See ACCESS TO JUSTICE (M. Cappelletti & B. Garth eds. 1978); J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL
JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA (1976); H. JACOB, JUSTICE IN
AMERICA: CoURTS, LAWYERS, AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 73-75 (4th ed. 1984),
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mission standards, have caused the legal profession to be overwhelmed
by the "rising tide of mediocrity" in American education (p. 65).
The two-track system is evident in the judiciary as well. The federal bench gets fast-track lawyers. Slow-track lawyers drift to the
state courts, where those issues most affecting the poor (employment,
marriage, property, safety, family) are at least initially decided. (pp.
74-75). The level of competence of the federal bench is high. State
judges have not met this standard; while many state judges serve quietly and well, others are corrupt, incompetent, and arbitrary. "They
have frequently refused to enforce the law and permitted delays,
backlogs, and hasty procedures that deny litigants any semblance of
due process of law" (p. 82). Forer suggests that the reasons for the
disparity between federal and state judges are the selection process
(usually politicized at the state level), working conditions, salaries, and
prestige (p. 82). Those state judges who manage to persevere, to remain honest, and to mete out concerned justice, find their rewards
predominantly in the self-satisfaction of the job well done and in the
appreciation occasionally expressed by those who come before the
court (p. 90).
Indigent litigants are further hampered by the expense of the trial
process. Delays in hearings, court fees, and costs incurred from
missed work, carfare, and child care, often force low-income individuals to forgo enforcement of their legal rights or to submit to unsatisfactory settlements. Delayed criminal hearings may prejudice an
accused's defense. (pp. 111-16). Indigent defendants, unable to raise
bail, cannot afford private investigators and expert witnesses. Juxtaposed against this situation is the wealthy defendant, with high-powered lawyers and litigation ~cience firms plotting his defense, whose
lengthy jury trial takes valuable court time away from victims of turnstile justice.
The two-track legal system and the disparity in resources haunt
the appellate process as well. Forer views the right to seek review of
trial court decisions as essential (p. 151). Because of inadequate presentation of their claims and defenses, poor litigants are subjected to a
greater probability of error and unjust results at trial (p. 152). However, despite the convicted person's right to representation by counsel
at public expense in taking an appeal, the trial record in a badly tried
case can make it impossible to get a fair appellate hearing (p. 158).
Moreover, poor defendants, considering their situations hopeless,
often fail to appeal (p. 158). Indigent civil litigants cannot wait several
years to collect damages for their injuries; even the threat of appeal
may lead them to settle for what they can get (pp. 153-55).
The author offers several proposals to begin to whittle away the
two-tiered approach to justice in the American legal system (pp. 20317). The first step is to shorten unduly long trials. Judges should
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schedule one major trial every two or three days, and defer those cases
that cannot meet this schedule (p. 205). Additionally, court access
fees, which only minimally reimburse the public for the costs of trials,
should be abolished. Rather, costs which actually reimburse the
courts should be imposed at the discretion of the judge, taking into
account trial time, the frivolous or substantial nature of the claim or
defense, delaying tactics, the amount in issue, and the ability of the
parties to pay (p. 206).
Porer also suggests that "[f]ree counsel should . . . be provided
for indigents in civil cases that involve substantial rights" (p. 206), and
that litigants should be allowed to select their own counsel from a list
of qualified attorneys (p. 207). "[N]ew qualifications for eligibility to
take . . . bar examination[s] would eliminate the most egregiously inept lawyers," and minimum standards of eligibility to the bench
should be established by law (p. 211). Appeals could be simplified by
limiting hearings to consideration oflegal issues, rather than bothering
with the often anomalous facts of a case (p. 212). Issues should be
decided once and for all, without devising tests, classifications of
rights, and varying levels of review which allow manipulation of the
law in response to shifting public opinion. Finally, Porer suggests informal exchange of ideas between courts and disciplines other than
law, and the establishment of a National Center for Legal Research to
study problems of equal access to justice (p. 216).
Porer admits that these suggestions may result in a "leveling
qown" rather than a "leveling up," but contends that substantial due
process rights would not be denied any party (p. 217). She finds that
modern theories of alternative dispute resolution are unsatisfactory
remedies because they would deny the poor access to the courts. 3 Increasing the number of judges is also inadequate because it would
lower judicial prestige and lead to anarchy in decision making (pp.
191-93).
Money and Justice is most thought-provoking when it offers the
reflections of an angry and disillusioned trial judge who has come to
regard the progress made in individual rights in the 1960's as a cruel
hoax for indigent litigants seeking the protections of due process (p.
110). Perhaps a more carefully drawn picture of this individual experience would have a more profound impact on the reader. As the book
is written, however, a reader may resist the sweeping two-tiered classifications the author makes: competent and incompetent lawyers; honest and corrupt judges; ignorant, helpless poor and crafty, powerful
3. The thrust of the popular panaceas is to deny access to the courts for a wide variety of
problems. Under the proposals the bulk of the cases that would be diverted from the courts
involve poor people. . • . [I]n operation they would institutionalize two separate and unequal systems of justice: courts of law with rights and constitutional safeguards for the rich
and speedy extralegal forums for the poor.
P. 195.
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rich; socially and economically useless corporate law and significant
claims of individuals.
Forer invites discussion of her proposed reforms (p. 217). In response to that invitation, one must question the appropriateness of allowing trial judges the discretion to decide what are significant cases,
and to impose costs based on the merits of claims and defenses. And
what would be the effects of deciding legal issues without the benefit of
facts and of "settling" legal principles once -and for all on those attributes of the common law which Forer so rigorously defends, namely
its flexibility, its vitality, and its paramount concern for the individual?4 Fip.ally, the author's notion of due process as essentially a principle of fairness is questionable. Can courts create an enclave of
fairness, which reflects no differences in resources, education, and
power, when the rest of society is in large part built upon such
differences?

4. In criticizing the use of sociological studies as bases for legal opinions, the author states
that "a legal system predicated upon the rights of the individual cannot operate on the basis of
averages and norms. It must treat each litigant and each case individually." P. 189.
Of the common law, Farer notes that "[c]ourts in the United States fulfill another very important but often ignored function: the development and modernization of the law...• American judges have a long tradition of interpreting law in the light of changed needs and conditions.
Good judges must continually be pouring new wine in old bottles." P. 40.

